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“Multiculturalist ideology and identity politics have corrupted the way we understand 
participatory democracy. Indeed, they’ve contributed to a general misperception of the 
meaning of politics itself.” 
- Adam Ellwanger1 
 
That identity politics has seemingly become a negatively loaded phrase, one that is deployed 
derisively by the mass media, probably comes as no surprise. Many contemporary debates 
are framed within the narrative of identity politics. Black Lives Matter? Identity politics. 
Preferred use of pronouns? Identity politics. The Christchurch mosque shootings? Probably 
identity politics. The presumed leftist takeover of the universities? Definitely identity 
politics. Over the past decade, this identity politics movement is thriving, with news outlets 
lashing on and reporting on this often assumed harmful political narrative. It is used on both 
ends of the political spectrum: from the growing left to the edges of the far-right. Both sides 
use identity politics as an accusation to frame topics that fall outside the political 
mainstream. This is an inherent contradiction, seeing as both sides are political outsiders 
themselves. However, interestingly, this single tendency is able to bind together the 
spectrum of the traditional left-right. The binding factor here is the methodology: a virulent 
focus on people’s identity – their gender, ethnicity, background, religion, sexuality, 
citizenship or culture2. Identity politics enables the forming of coalitions. These come with 
demands that are based on shared understandings of what it means to be a specific 
individual – say, an African-American in the USA or a cis gay man in the UK. Identity politics 
speaks to large classes of people that are bound together by their shared identity and their 
rights that are demanded because of this. Identity politics is specifically relevant within a 
democratic framework – where it thrives domestically and can even spill-over into foreign 
policy. 
This master thesis will explore the broad topic of identity politics. It is divided into two parts. 
Firstly, a theoretical framework will be provided. Through a systematic approach, identity 
politics will be theoretically examined step-by-step, starting with the concept of identity 
 
1 Ellwanger (2019) 
2 Penny (2019)  
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itself. The structure will methodologically move from identity to groupness to the concept in 
its entirety. Arguments in favour and against the use identity politics will be presented. 
Then, the link with liberal democracies will be explored. Here, as well, arguments will be 
given in favour and against. Lastly, the theoretical framework moves beyond a domestic 
narrative by linking the concept to the study of International Relations. This international 
dimension will focus on foreign policy. The theory will be applied in the second part, where 
practical examples of identity politics will be examined. India and the United States serve as 
the two case studies. A conclusion will follow to answer the main question: “To what extent 
does identity politics domestically and internationally influence politics, democracies and 
foreign policy?” Of course, the whole endeavour starts with a brief literature review. 
 
Reviewing the existing literature 
‘Identity’ as a research topic is very common in academia. It even experienced a surge in the 
last two decades. Identity as an analytical tool is not without difficulties – its loose definition 
and loose application raises questions on the utility and validity of the concept. What is 
identity? How is it shaped? Is it a determinant factor for behaviour and does it affect 
political affiliations and values? Regardless of these difficulties, when examining ‘identity 
politics’, it is important to start with research on identity. When the dynamics of identity 
formation are known, this can then be applied to different levels of perspective – from local 
to the state level. 
The literature review starts with the great “Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the 
Struggle for Recognition” by Francis Fukuyama. This serves as starting point because it is not 
only one of the latest books on the topic, Fukuyama’s work has also been featured many 
times within popular media due to his strong statements about how harmful identity politics 
is. Fukuyama holds that identity politics causes the fragmentation of social cohesion - where 
cohesion is the necessary foundation for political consensus. This fragmentation enables 
ideological and cultural diversity that counteracts a strong sense of belonging. This causes 
the search for identity in specific identity based movements. This enables a form of 
pluralism based on identity. This harms democracies because the demanded political 
change is framed within identity terms as well. People then vote on the basis of identity. 
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When policies are pursuit based on identity, other identity groups are in danger of being 
shut out. One identity group can ultimately be harmful for larger society. 
The narrative that Fukuyama presents is clear. To examine his claims, Mary Bernstein’s work 
“Identity Politics” is the first step. Bernstein’s work is extensive, elaborate and consists of 
summaries of other academic works. She is one of the few researchers who produced an 
extensive work on the topic of identity politics alone. When reading other works, Bernstein 
is often referenced. Bernstein’s main point is that identity politics is descriptive, instead of 
explanatory. She underlines her point by demonstrating that different approaches to 
identity politics, yield different interpretations. Whilst there are different theoretical 
traditions, the underlying message remains the same: identity politics only holds descriptive 
power. Identity politics departs from traditional class-based movements and is defined as a 
form of (political) activism organized in status-based social movements3. Bernstein carries 
forward a cautionary message. She warns analysts that they must be careful in using the 
concept ‘identity’ – its multi-directional focus and loose application raises concerns about 
the utility and validity of the concept.  
Bernstein reiterates the difficulty of using ‘Identity’ as an analytical concept. This potentially 
forms a problematic base for the entire study of identity politics. Which has been 
demonstrated well in “An Introduction to the Special Issue on Identity Politics”, written by 
Kumar et al. The choice for this work as the third analytical undertaking is because Kumar et 
al. also compile multiple other sources in their work. The most straightforward message 
reads that identity is spatially and temporally contingent, meaning that identity and also 
identity politics is socially constructed. Identity politics therefore becomes not only a 
construct; it is also contingent on the geographical and historical narrative4. That does not 
mean that identity politics is not a valid or a fruitless endeavour. It still forms large part of 
contemporary resistance movements where it is born out of historical power dynamics and 
has broad political influence5. This means that identity politics is real. 
Where Bernstein already concluded in her meta-analyses that identity politics is a departure 
from class politics, Brown, who is continuously mentioned in the work by Kumar et al., goes 
 
3 Ibid. 
4 Kumar et al. (2018), 5. 
5 Ibid, 6. 
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even further and claims that identity politics is a manifestation of class politics6. Those who 
are classified within the confines of identity politics are not seeking to dismantle existing 
class structures but instead seek honest representation of minorities among the broader 
classes. Brown highlights thereby the focus on the individual domain and the individual 
perception of prejudice and intolerance7. This is a constructivist’ narrative. Identity politics 
can be utilized against the state to enforce legal remedies. Building on that, Kumar et al. 
asserts that there are critics claiming that this essentialism is just that: identity politics is 
strategic and operational and not a particular form of political liberation. The movements 
that are formed are a consequence of the unfair distribution of rights and goods; meaning 
that identity politics answers to the shortcomings of a liberal society. This is affirmed by 
multiple scholars, including Lani Guiner, an American civil rights theorist, and Gerald Torres, 
a prominent figure in critical race theory8. Courtney Jung, in her work “Why Liberals Should 
Value Identity Politics”, maintains that identity politics exposes a power imbalance that 
threatens the health of a democratic society9.  
The examination that follows is the search for a possible causal relationship between 
identity politics and changing the political reality. Because when identity politics causes the 
formation of social movements that aim for political change; to what extent is there 
causality? This question holds for the domestic level and for the state level; where the 
national identity acts as a determinant and causal factor for the state’s preferences towards 
a particular (international) agenda. When focussing on the latter, a shift has to be made 
away from traditional realist assumptions. Constructivism is often presented as the viable 
alternative of realism, yet, is not always taken seriously. Bucher and Jasper, who published 
one of the most recent works about identity, claim that identity research is too focused on 
individualistic terms and that that causes the underappreciation of the complex, continuous 
developing and socially interdependent context in which the state actor is situated10. The 
complexity of a causal approach towards identity (also because of the difficulty of the 
concept) is underlined by multiple academic sources, ranging from, among others, Elias in 
 
6 Claimed by Brown (2015) but taken from Kumar et al. (2018), 9. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Both references are taken from Jung (2006), 33.  
9 Jung (2006), 33. 
10 Bucher & Jasper (2016), 393. 
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1978 to Guillaume in 200711. It is commonplace to accept the rational actor explanation for 
state behaviour due to the rationalist mainstream, yet Alexandrov points out that identity as 
a concept must receive the attention it deserves; even though this constructivist concept 
conflicts with mainstream rationalist assumptions12.  
When analysing identity politics from the perspective of the state the topic of analysis 
becomes ‘state identity’. This is understandable because the ascriptive identities, like race 
and gender, are only applicable on an individual level. When analysing a concept that is 
based on identity characteristics, this identity must be conceptualized first. This means that 
the focus on ‘national identity’ is a reasonable first step to tackle the international 
dimension of identity politics. That said, there is not enough empirical evidence to suggest 
that state identity an sich is a causal determinant for state preferences, interests and 
policies. The state identity does have the ability to shape state behaviour but this is done 
through state representatives and other relevant political actors . These actors reinforce, 
redefine or weaken contemporary beliefs about the state’s representation and their 
accompanying behaviour. According to Alexandrov, this process is known as state identity 
politics and has as goal to influence foreign policy and the relations with other states13. 
Within its most basic and narrow sense is state identity politics a process that influences the 
state’s identity. This implies that the identity of a state remains a relevant, important and 
indispensable topic when  researching identity politics. 
There is an extensive body of IR literature devoted to state behaviour and realism. The way 
to challenge realist assumptions is by testing a scenario where a state’s foreign policy 
prioritizes identity over security considerations. Deepa M. Ollapally, an international affairs 
research professor at George Washington University, embarks on that quest and establishes 
beforehand that the strongest scenario against realism would be the pursuit of identity 
imperatives at the expense of the country’s overall security14. Of course, motivations have 
to be established a priori. Ollapally, in her article “Foreign Policy and Identity Politics: Realist 
versus Culturalist Lessons”, presents the Iran-Iraq war as the scenario that opposes realism. 
She uses Iranian foreign policy to demonstrate that the behaviour of Iran’s elite, at least in 
 
11 References taken from Bucher & Jasper (2016), 394. 
12 Alexandrov (2003), 34. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ollapally (1998), 255. 
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relation to the Iraq war in 1980-1988, is inconsistent with the expected realist paradigm. 
She analyses the pre-war period and the 1982 war-prolongation and concludes that the 
explanation of Iran’s reaction to the threat of Iran’s territorial integrity could only be 
explained using identity considerations. The war-prolongation refers to the situation in 
1982, when the Iraqi army had largely withdrew from Iranian territory, and Iran still decided 
to continue the war. A logical realist approach, which would be security driven, would 
consist of attempts to end the war. Instead, Iran continued the war. This behaviour can only 
fully be explained with the addition of the Islamic worldview and Iranian state identity. 
Ollapally demonstrates that the effects of state identity should not be neglected. Whether 
or not there is a direct connection between state identity and foreign policy depends on the 
willingness and on the viability of disregarding the dominant discourse. Ollapally did 
excellent work in providing the first step; assuming that the Iran-Iraq war is not unique in its 
kind. So, the real question would be whether or not IR scholars would seriously consider the 
effects of socio-cultural factors and then specifically the identity paradigm when studying 
foreign policy. The hesitance is understandable since constructivism remains secondary 
compared to realism. This is underlined by Kenneth Waltz, who wrote one of the most 
influential IR works: “Theory of International Politics”, a book where he demonstrated the 
academic importance of realism, rational-actor assumptions and the anarchical 
international system. That said, the recognition of the relevance of socio-culture factors 
does not necessarily undermine the significance of the interests that serve as the main 
driving force of state behaviour. Instead, it allows scholars to see how socio-cultural factors 
might temper these interests. 
What does the literature review demonstrates? The choice for the reviewed academics 
might seem limited, but all are strategically chosen. The choice was based on how influential 
their work was, how recent their publications were and if there work was a sort of ‘meta-
analysis’. Because with the latter, there are automatically more scholars taken into account. 
That said, the limitation also comes from the realization that most scholars approach 
identity politics one-sided. It is either very much focused on its relationship to economics, 
race, liberalism, nationalism or Marxism, or it specifically focuses only on identity. That said, 
the literature teaches that identity politics is real, that it is descriptive, a type of political 
activism, relevant from the state level and that it is grounded in constructivism.  
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What does the literature review demonstrates? The choice for the reviewed academics 
might seem limited, but all are strategically chosen. The choice was based on how influential 
their work was, how recent their publications were and if there work was a sort of ‘meta-
analysis’. Because with the latter, there are automatically more scholars taken into account. 
That said, the limitation also comes from the realization that most scholars approach 
identity politics one-sided. It is either very much focused on its relationship to economics, 
race, liberalism, nationalism or Marxism, or it specifically focuses only on identity. That said, 
the literature teaches that identity politics is real, that it is descriptive, a type of political 
activism, also relevant from the state level and that it is grounded in constructivism.  
Considering previous research, what misses is the entire story: from individual emergence 
to state expression. The link between individuals who classify their politics as identity based 
and how these individuals, as state officials, influence state behaviour (through foreign 
policy) is the whole story and therefore occupies the main topic of this thesis. The 
underlying element that links these ingredients together is democracies. Based on 
Fukuyama’s analysis; identity politics specifically manifests itself within the confines of a 
liberal democracy and it is the freedoms that democratic societies bring forward that 
enables this political activism. And in order to provide the reader with the whole story of 
identity politics the relationship with liberal democracies must be explored. But in order to 
embark on any analysis an introduction and definition must be provided first. 
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Part 1 – Theoretical Framework 
Introducing ‘Identity Politics’ 
Before reliably defining the term identity politics understand that the rhetorical noise 
surrounding it has enabled an automatic sense of disregard, especially within popular 
media. Dr. Christina Greer describes that its contemporary usage differs from its historical 
definition15. The former has gotten a bad reputation, where Greer states that identity 
politics as a term is merely used as a descriptive mechanism without its original, historical, 
basis16. Used by those who are arguing against the concept. When talking heads mention 
‘identity politics’, they often steer away from adequately defining the concept17.  A parallel 
can be drawn with how George Orwell, in his essay ‘Politics and the English Language’, 
commented on the word ‘fascism’; where the word has become little more than a reference 
to “something not desirable”. This same dynamic is happening here; where identity politics 
is the new fascism – and in the same way the new neo-liberalism and the new populism; 
where both terms experience the same negatively-laden scrutiny without a solid academic 
basis18. At least within popular media. Identity politics has become a shorthand for what 
one finds undesirable. The present-day use of the term has together with its rhetorical 
cousin political correctness been reduced to a political buzzword status19. 
Identity politics, when trying to identity its historical definition, signifies a broad range of 
political activity that has its foundation in the shared experiences of (past) injustices of the 
members of a specific identity-based social group20. These identity-based groups organize 
deliberately and explicitly around a specific identity, rather than their party affiliation or 
belief systems. Their desired objective is to ensure the political freedom of their 
constituency that has been marginalized within its larger context21. The members of the 
constituency use their distinctiveness, what in essence constitutes their identity, to dispute 
the dominant and oppressive reality. There is a demand for recognition and legitimization 
 
15 She explains this in a Sunday Civics video episode. See bibliography. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Oliver (2018). 
18 This parallel is described by Timothy Oliver. Ibid. 
19 In an article assessing mass media, Parker Molloy draws this conclusion. See: 
https://www.mediamatters.org/laura-ingraham/media-keep-talking-about-identity-politics-what-does-it-even-
mean-anymore 
20 Bliss (2013), 1013 and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
21 Ibid. 
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within larger society22. In simple terms, ‘identity politics’ refers to those political actions that 
are oriented at the needs, interests and values of collective groups that possess a shared 
identity23. In turn, ‘identity’ refers to the sense of self in relation to others; to the ones 
around oneself24. This means that identity signifies “a place in society”25. This individual-
specific identity consists of different markers, where each person carries a unique 
combination of these markers within26. Examples of markers are religious beliefs, 
physiognomic features, gendered experiences, linguistic abilities and cultural habits. A 
plurality of these markers forms ones identity and one’s identity politics is often shaped by 
one of the identity markers. 
Examining the ‘identity’ concept 
‘Identity’ and its formation is widely studied in the social sciences, humanities and arts. 
Defining ‘identity’ is not specifically necessary when building a case surrounding identity 
politics, because any definitional attempts of it are simultaneously embedded with an 
explanation of identity. However, it is interesting to take a moment to see how the concept 
of identity is related to politics. In doing so, a closer look at the notion of identity is 
inevitable. Identity, as a concept, is necessarily and unavoidably defined by two opposites: 
difference and sameness27. When someone declares to have a specific identity (trait) then 
one claims at the same time that he or she is in that sense identical to other persons or 
entities that possess that same identity (trait). Concurrently, these identity traits are 
perceived as being unique, as making up unique qualities: one’s identity. This 
simultaneously provokes differentiation and delineation when compared to the ones who 
do not identify as such. Inevitably, a divide between the possessors and the non-possessors 
of this identity (trait) is established. This delineation thus leads to inevitable forms of 
exclusion: where exclusion is inherent and unavoidable to the identity concept 28. This also 
means that identity is undeniable related to the external world – the world that provides 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Thiel and Coate (2010), 1. 
24 Ibid, preface. 
25 As described by Simon (1999) in “A Place in the World: Self and Social Categorization” 
26 ‘Marker’ as a reference is taken from S. Gupta. 
27 Hekman (1999), 5. 
28 Tilly (2015), 8. 
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the separation between one and the other29. This means that the one who possess this 
identity is different than the one who does not. The relation of the individual with the 
external world is providing the delineation necessary for identity formation. In addition, 
(personal) identity presents a sense of continuity and endurance30. This is seen in the Latin 
roots of the word ‘identity’ where idem means ‘the same’31. This ‘sameness’ represents the 
continuity of a personality; it signifies the idea that a person remains roughly the same 
throughout its life32. All this teaches us, is that being unique, through an identity, also means 
being the same in two ways: namely being identical to others that share the same identity 
(traits) and being identical to oneself over time. This dynamic introduces a paradox: 
sameness is creating individuality – “being the same makes you different”33. The play of 
opposites is an inescapable battle presented within the concept of identity34.  
It was professor W.J.M. Mackenzie, a professor of government and politics, who was one of 
the first that tried to track the emergence of identity politics. He used the etymological 
roots of identity (that is: sameness) as a starting point. From thereon, he traced the identity 
evolution from seeking recognition to a means for the establishment and characterization of 
collectives35. Mackenzie hypothesized that the history of identity politics dates back to the 
50’s and 60’s of the last century, implying the relative newness of the term. Mackenzie 
studied the emergence of the social and political movements that unfolded a new narrative 
in the United States; one centred around the claims of injustice. The Black Civil Rights 
movement and the Lesbian and Gay Liberation movement, as well as the second of was of 
feminism, propelled the debate that concerns the origins, nature and future of identity 
groups. Unfortunately, any further rendering of the history lays beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 Rowland (1994), 132. 
31 Ibid. 
32 This is taken from how the English Oxford Dictionary defines identity, as further explained by Hekman (1999) 
33 Hekman (1999), 5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 His book is called “Political Identity” (1978) 
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From ‘identity’ to ‘groupness’ 
Aforementioned quickly highlights how similar identity (traits) invoke a sense of ‘sameness’. 
Those unique characteristics make up a stepping stone for the creation of groups. When 
individuals mutually identify with one another people cluster together to form identity 
groups36. This is then called the collective identity and refers to the cognition that the 
members of a single group share: it signifies the characteristic of the group37.  When these 
groups are created a specific dynamic between group membership and the understanding 
of a deeper sense of self surfaces. When the groups cognition is based on history, specifaclly 
on past grievances, then the most dominant form of identity politics surfaces38. Here, the 
historical narrative forms a trajectory that constructs the essence of the groups identity 
politics39. It is the history of these identity groups that provides the individual group 
members the story of how its specific identity is perceived through time and how they are 
perceived in its larger societal context; often through comparisons40. This is where the link 
with politics is presented; its historical narrative provides the groups with the context on 
how to view contemporary political issues and how they should ascertain past and present 
challenges. The challenges that are characterized by social exclusion pertain to those where 
its historical narrative is written on the basis of oppression and marginalization41. The 
oppression was based on the identity itself, meaning that these groups experienced (social) 
exclusion, only on the virtue of having a particular identity. It is the experience of the 
oppression that brings about particular perspectives and needs of the oppressed groups; 
both of which were unable to be assimilated through the existing political power 
structures42. The reaction to this is the involvement of group members in political action on 
behalf of the collective (the identity group)43. When group members engage in political 
protest the collective identity politicizes44. The focus is on the struggle for power, where 
group members want to change, establish or defend existing power structures. As said, this 
 
36 Guttman (2009), 2. 
37 Klandermans (2013), 3. 
38 Kumar et al. (2018), 6. 
39 Liu & Hilton (2005), 538. 
40 Ibid, 539. 
41 For a more thorough analysis on social exclusion see, for instance, the work by Robin Peace: “Social 
Exclusion: A Concept in Need of Definition?” (2001) 
42 Heyes (2009) 
43 Klandermans (2013), 4. 
44 Ibid. 
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process starts with the groups’ awareness of the shared past grievances where the 
collective identity  forms, at least in part, the basis of these grievances. In general, this 
political activism is brought under the heading of identity politics. 
Identity politics, in essence, seeks recognition and accommodation of identity-related 
differences45. Identity politics can therefore be seen as a form of activism which aims to, first, 
end domination, and, second, to transform the institutions and power structures that 
prevent the marginalized groups from the participation in the determination of their own 
actions46. 
 
Other aspects worth emphasizing 
Aforementioned explanation should suffice in giving a general idea of what identity politics 
is. In short, historical power-dynamics form the driver of this type of political activism. The 
exploited and marginalized groups form collective identities that get politicized as a 
response to the desire and the willingness to change the existing power structures that 
failed to include them in actions of self-determination. The most known examples of 
identity-based collectives are groups centred around nationality, race, ethnicity, class, 
religion, gender or sexuality. This identity, say being a women or a gay men, makes the 
person vulnerable for cultural imperialism, exploitation, violence and powerlessness. 
Mostly, identity politics starts off with the reality of oppression. What follows is the re-
description, reclaiming, and transformation of the stigmatized group47. This means that the 
negative ascriptions voiced by the dominant culture are rejected. Within these groups it is 
the individual identity that is placed as a secondary - a separate matter48. This means that 
considerations of the collective identity supersedes the considerations of the individual 
identity.  
Another important observation is that identity politics is not the same as the politics of 
recognition. The departure can be found in the demand for recognition based on the same 
grounds upon which recognition had previously been denied: demanding recognition 
 
45 Page 517, “Identity Politics” by James Tully 
46 Page 72, “Problematising the Political Theory of Identity Politics” by Bregham Dalgliesh 
47 Heyes (2009) 
48 Gupta (2007), 8. 
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because one is a woman as a consequence of recognition that has been denied because she 
is a woman49. This specific demand is not one that fits in the “universal humankind” 
narrative; a narrative that is based on the many shared attributes that humans possess, nor 
is it a demand for respect despite one’s differences. Instead, the demand is one because of 
the difference50.  
 
Disclaimer 
Identity politics is an umbrella term for a specific form of political activism. This means that 
the scope of political movements that can be categorized as such is broad. The examples 
given in popular media and academic literature are mostly from struggles within Western 
capitalist democracies but similar narratives and arguments are made within the wider 
political universe. Indigenous rights movements and groups that demand regional and 
national self-determination are perfect examples of identity politics outside the established 
context. There is no clear rulebook that classifies specific political struggles as an illustration 
of identity politics. Instead, for this thesis onwards, it must be acknowledged that identity 
politics here solely refers to those political activities that advocate for the social position of 
the collective that has previously been suppressed, neglected or erased. The demand for 
any more descriptive details is not only unrealistic, because the term simply is intended to 
cover a broad array of political actions, but also implies an impracticable and thorough 
analysis of the inexhaustible literature that covers multiple academic disciplines; an 
endeavour already embarked on by the academia who wanted to define ‘populism’; a term 
that ended up signifying a wide (yet demarcated) range of political activity as well51. 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Kruks (2001), 58. 
50 Ibid. 
51 As concluded by one of the most influential political scientists who studies populism: Cas Mudde. See for 
instance the introductory book he wrote together with Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) 
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Arguments against identity politics 
Over-determination 
Building on the premise that individual identity is built on a unique combination of markers, 
a collective would magnify one of these markers and take it as a common denominator for 
its members. It is implicitly accepted that this common denominator confers a shared sense 
of experience on its members, one that enables a perception of mutual understanding and 
joint aspirations. This facilitates a sense of allegiance52. Subsequently, the specific focus on 
one marker can harmfully lead to its over-determination. An individual is thereby reduced to 
only one aspect of their identity; or merely reduced to their identity-based collective. When 
analysing this from a policy perspective, the possibility of over-determination still exists. 
Racial policies, or the opposition thereof, insists on the over-determination of physiognomic 
features. Feminist policies might emphasize the over-determination of what it means to be 
a woman. This over-determination can lead to a fixed idea about what constitutes a 
particular identity trait, leaving no room for other individual experiences and 
interpretations. Also, an individual’s identity might serve as secondary importance – leaving 
collective identity hierarchical higher; thereby leaving little room for individual 
development. 
 
Polarization 
The formation and association of identity (groups) do not require political values and 
ideologies. Identity is based on inclusion and exclusion53. The formation of groups, which is 
in this case based on identity, can fulfil two basic psychological needs: inclusion, where one 
is part of the group, and exclusion, where one distinguishes oneself from other groups. 
Before diving too much into sociology and the social identity theory, it suffices to say that 
inclusion and exclusion is a precursor for the well-studied us versus them mentality. It 
enables in-group privilege and favouritism and out-group derogation54. Since identity does 
not rely on an adherence to ideology or creed, an increased dislike towards other groups is 
 
52 Gupta (2007), 8 
53 Brewer (2001), 118. 
54 Mason (2018), 869. 
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without a direct link to issue-based ideological disagreements55. This could foster identity-
based polarization. If this is translated into politics, then the identity-based polarization 
might spill over into political decisions. Participation in politics can therefore be exercised 
based on factors other than contemporary political concerns.   
 
Arguments in favour of identity politics 
Critiquing conventional norms 
The irrefutable reality is that individuals have been denied access to acts of self-
determination based on specific identity traits. Marginalization is not a myth and the well-
known civil rights and feminist movements were a necessary reaction to the prejudice and 
unfairness in the political system. Women being denied rights just for being a woman and 
men of colour being denied jobs or citizenship because of their race or ethnicity are just 
three real life examples of the skewness of the system. Identity politics can be seen as the 
answer to this – taking back self-determination and fighting against the narrative that 
certain identity traits are inferior. Identity politics is the response to the unjust system and 
the unjust hierarchies as a consequence. Whether or not one beliefs in, for instance, the 
existence of the white male patriarchy, certain social groups belief that the patriarchy is an 
undeniable reality and built their narrative around it. Identity politics embodies the 
persuasion that inequality and injustice are wrong. Treating women the same as men; just 
as black and whites; extending suffrage to individuals without property; equalizing economic 
opportunity regardless of the lack of resources.  
 
Social progress 
To build on previous, identity politics constitutes attempts to create a more inclusive and 
fair society: identity politics drives social progress. One of the biggest struggles of our 
human existence is the push for justice and equality across the whole spectrum of what it 
means to be a human. From race, to religion, to gender, sexual orientation and so forth. Due 
to identity politics, these identity traits are incorporated into the governing reality of a 
 
55 For a short overview of studies that concluded this dynamic see page 870. Ibid. 
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political nation. By accepting the political nature of, for instance, gender and race, these 
matters are as a consequence taking outside the moral realm into the realm of (political) 
actions and legislation. Moral rhetoric is transformed into enforcing legal mechanisms.  
 
Identity politics and its relation with democracies 
There is an uneasy but necessary place for identity politics in democracies. Francis 
Fukuyama claims that identity politics is undermining democracy56. Before thoroughly 
analysing that claim it is interesting to understand that a key condition for the existence of 
contemporary identity politics is institutionalized liberal democracy itself57. Liberal 
democracies come with certain freedoms; freedoms that enable, for instance, individuals to 
associate and form groups. Association naturally happens in free societies because it is 
inevitable that individuals will mutually identify in many ways, including political relevant 
ways58. Whenever association is prohibited then a society becomes a tyranny. Associational 
freedom is therefore the legitimizing factor that facilitates identity groups. The freedom of 
expression, speech and political participation – all democratic freedoms – ensure the 
functioning and continuation of identity groups and thus their politics. In other words: 
identity politics is a by-product of the freedoms brought forward in liberal democracies59.    
 
Difficulties 
The most apparent contradiction can be found in the most fundamental democratic value. A 
just democracy treats its individuals as civic equals. They accord individuals their freedoms 
equally, and this equal regard account for the most fundamental fairness in the system. This 
means that a just democracy has individuals as its ultimate source – not groups60. Whenever 
the ultimate source would be groups, they will subordinate the equal freedom and civic 
equality of persons. Treating a group as if it were morally ultimate would be inconsistent 
 
56 See this Washington Post article: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/09/18/identity-politics/ 
57 Claimed by Brown (1995) 
58 Guttman (2009), 4. 
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with the idea that individuals could live their life in the way that suits them best. Whenever 
self-appointed groups would occupy the moral high ground there is the possibility of them 
imposing their identity on individuals; people who might desire otherwise. That would then, 
in essence, presuppose the idea that people can choose and live their life as they aspire. 
There is ultimately an inherent contradiction between democracies’ focus on the individual 
– and identity politics’ focus on groups. 
To add to that, when making democratic decisions based on identity means surpassing 
decisions based on ideology. Politics might be dominated by the identity narrative which can 
lead to the fragmentation of society based on these different identity groups. The 
democratic process would be about competing identity proposals; where each identity 
proposal constitutes an idea about the national self, meaning: state identification and its 
specific behaviours61.  
 
Advantages 
Those difficulties do not imply that identity groups are not a legitimate source in the 
democratic process. Better yet: groups are both important and valuable. Groups can 
influence individuals identities without compromising their freedoms – both are not 
necessarily incompatible. Individuals value groups because groups introduce the value of 
mutual identification, relationships and support62. All of which are necessary conditions for 
the appreciation of oneself. This would ultimately play into the value of democracies: it is 
exactly this freedom that people can choose to identify as group members; and more often 
than not does group membership offers benefits vital to individuals wellbeing. To add to 
that, groups have the potential to combat injustice. Because in democracies, numbers 
count. So groups have the ability to change unjust policies and power structures due to the 
fact that they outnumber a mere individual. At its core, political influence is legitimately 
exercised when a plurality of individuals, in this case through identity groups, make their 
voice heard.  
 
61 Term and line of reasoning proposed by Lisel Hintz in chapter 2 of “Linking Identity Politics and Foreign 
Policy” 
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Moving beyond the domestic narrative – linking identity politics to International Relations 
Applying ‘identity’ to states 
Identity as a concept and as the embeddedness in identity politics has originally been 
developed for the democratic citizen63. Then how is this applied to states?. States and 
individuals are different entities and at multiple levels incomparable. However, there is 
extensive academic literature that is accepting of the general applicability of the (individual) 
identity concept to the state64. In the framework that is used here, state identity and 
identity politics are analysed from the level of policy makers; and specifically how these 
individuals are using their identity to influence state behaviour. These state officials (state 
actors) are acting on behalf of their state and their actions are observed through its foreign 
policy behaviour. The focus therefore stays with the individual. This means that identity – 
and how it is developed for persons, can also be applied to the level of the state. 
As mentioned, identity politics can lead to competing identity proposals and, in turn, create 
different expectations on how governments should reinforce these identity proposals. 
Building on the work by Lisel Hintz; identity proposals consists of prescribed and proscribed 
behaviours both for the state and the self65. This means that there is, to some extent, an 
understanding of what are (un)acceptable points of contention from those who support a 
different identity proposal. Not every identity proposal is accepted in the framework of 
domestic politics and Hintz argues that whenever supporters encounter a blockade they are 
driven “outside” the national stage. Using transnational activist networks, diasporic politics 
and international institutional conditionality, the battle for identity recognition moves 
international66. Lisel Hintz continues by arguing that whenever the domestic stage is 
surpassed a government’s foreign policy is taking over as an alternative arena67. This is not 
the only institution/ mechanism/ activism that has the possibility to do so but Hintz argues 
that a foreign policy agenda is traditionally linked with a nation’s national identity. National 
identity beliefs are being spilled over into foreign policy, and this makes the link with 
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identity politics apparent68. From here onwards, the focus will lie on foreign policy; a 
subfield of International Relations. 
Challenging Rational Actor assumptions 
State action (and in particular foreign policy) is traditionally rooted in rational actor 
assumptions, materialistic accounts and security considerations. This, of course, opposes 
identity related concerns that are rooted in the socio-cultural realm. Nevertheless, identity 
is becoming increasingly relevant within International Relations theory69. This idea is rooted 
in the belief that “foreign policy expresses not only what one wants, but also what one is”70. 
A good example of this can be found in the post-Soviet states. The ideological flux and the 
internal and external crisis combined with the process of nation building enabled the 
increased importance of identity, symbols and ideas71. When looking at the foreign policy 
strategy of Georgia, a post-Soviet country that could have easily identified itself with the 
Caucasus, or to a lesser extent due to geography with the Middle East, choose to focus its 
identity construction on the European identity. This became essential in its political 
discourse as much as it became a huge cultural driver72. Whilst this example is missing the 
necessary details, the main message is that identity can be an important driving force in a 
country’s foreign policy agenda. Identity is becoming increasingly important in International 
Relations. 
 
The international dimension of ‘identity’ in identity politics 
Francis Fukuyama claims that most (if not all) of the contemporary political struggles, from 
social movements to democratic revolutions to Islamism and nationalism, are founded in 
the desire for public recognition. Therefore, essentially, can they be categorized as matters 
framed as identity politics73. This means that identity plays a central role and whilst identity 
politics has been discussed from the perspective of the individual, when the perspective is 
changed to the level of the state the same struggles regarding recognition hold. Indicating 
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that identity politics is still relevant when you steer away from the local level; this is because 
the identity of a state (meaning: the state’s national identity) is essential and decisive in 
harbouring states’ fortunes and averting misfortunes74. When the national identity is weak, 
the state can disintegrate into failed states; this is what happened to for instance Yemen 
and Libya75. Other Middle Eastern countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria, have 
seen their weak national identity being played out through chaos and internal insurgency. 
The problems of those countries are of course multifaceted, span across time and space and 
have the burden of an imperial past. Nevertheless, their struggles are undeniably related to 
matters of identity – specifically on disagreements regarding religion and ethnicity76. This is 
also seen in sub-Saharan Africa, in countries like Kenya and Nigeria; where identity matters 
remained unresolved and their national unity has to be described as weak. Divide among 
religious and ethnicity lines, caused a weak identity which led to high levels of corruption 
and poverty77.  
It works the other way around as well: countries with a strong national identity, like China, 
Korea and Japan, who have experienced tremendous (economic) growth in the twentieth 
and the early twenty-first century, did so because these countries did not have to settle 
domestic matters and questions of identity first. Of course, these countries all experienced 
social upheavals and other forms of unrest but what sets them apart is that these countries 
could rely on a solid foundation of statehood.  
So far, it has become clear that identity matters. Identity as a topic of research within the 
foreign policy field emerged in the nineties of the last century78. The scholarship was born 
under the heading of constructivism, where it tried to explain how identity is shaping state 
behaviour and, reversely, how the international structure itself can aid in the shaping of 
state identity. Constructivists, and post-structuralists alike are additionally arguing that the 
identity (which is tied to particular interests and preferences) is a determinant factor of 
state action79.  
 
74 Written by Francis Fukuyama in https://www.abc.net.au/religion/why-national-identity-matters/10559382 
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78 “Identity and Foreign Policy” by Srdjan Vucetic  
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This overlaps greatly with the research on the international dimension of identity politics. 
The idea is that identity politics functions as a determinant factor – one that shapes foreign 
policy decisions80. The accompanying reasoning operates among the same lines as when 
one explains the formation of one’s own internal identity. This formation always happens in 
relation to the other; where possessors and non-possessors of identity traits are categorized 
as belonging (or not belonging) to the same identity. This interaction with the external 
world creates boundaries that separates you from me and us from them. A separation that 
inevitably leads to exclusion, especially considering that the boundaries of an identity are 
constructed through unavoidable interactions with ‘the other’ – meaning that exclusion is 
inherent to the identity concept. A ‘by-product’ of this identity formation and exclusion is 
the nation – as a theoretical concept and practical construct81. This is because the nation 
also delineates the national self from the international other; a process that served as a 
prior necessity for national integration82. This process historically lead to the mutual 
attachment and common fate of a nation’s inhabitants. This, in turn, generates national 
unity. ‘The Other’ in this scenario could be the inhabitants that share the same territory but 
differ in their cultural, historical, ethnical, political or religious considerations, or, it can be 
outside nations that are interacting with said nation in any shape or form.  ‘The Other’ can 
also signify a set of diverging values or conflicting characteristics.  
The practical reality of this Self-Other demarcation is that it enables the formation of policy 
ascriptions. This generally means that the Self-Other demarcation shapes state behaviour. It 
provides the state with the framework on how to view oneself, others, certain norms and 
values and what the appropriate behaviour is to enforce or counter any outside friction. In 
line with this, there are two underlying motivations for states to pursue these ideals. The 
first is to be able to perceive and counter any possible threats that might harm the nation’s 
physical or spiritual stability83. The second serves as an explanatory and legitimizing force; 
one that legitimizes political ideologies and policies84. The dynamics that are at hand here 
are similar to the individual and are also arguably identical to the specific study on identity 
formation. Nevertheless, it is important to understand state-level dynamics and how in 
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general identity shapes state behaviour. Mayim Alexandrov designed a graphical 
representation of the literature on (state) identity, behaviour and international relations 
theory, as can be seen in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: a graphical representation of contemporary international relations theory and its 
understanding about the possible directions within state identity85 
 
Back to the individual – how is foreign policy influenced? 
The interesting question that remains unsolved is how previous identity research is a matter 
of identity politics. In order to answer, the circle must be completed and be brought back to 
the individual level of analysis; only this time in relation to the nation’s government and 
politics. Individuals have specific identities – and some have multiple. These identities and 
the accompanying loyalties have evolved drastically over the fast few centuries86. It became 
anchored within the territorial state in such a way that individuals are no longer ‘subjects’ of 
the ruling elites but instead national ‘citizens’ of the government they ‘belong’ to87. The 
hierarchical bonds have been displaced with an identity-based membership within a 
geographical and juridical space. To identify as a citizen within territorial boundaries became 
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the essence of a political identity88. The state has always been a powerful entity; one that 
has been reinforced through its coercive capabilities. Another powerful tool has been (and 
still is) socialisation, where the hierarchical dominance of the citizen’s identity is assured. 
There has been another major shift within the political realm and that is the possibility for 
citizens to enter the political arena and participate within the political field. Individuals have 
the possibility to influence politics and exercise power through the different mechanisms 
present within a nation’s institutional architecture. This entails a departure from the 
historical requirement of, for instance, being born in the right family in order to have a say 
in matters of power and government. This does not only hold for liberal democratic 
societies – Xi Jinping’s China and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey serve as two examples, 
among many. Citizens have the possibility to become state representatives, political 
entrepreneurs or, more generally, a political actor. These actors have the possibility to 
influence, alter, reinforce or weaken their states’ representations and beliefs. These 
representations and beliefs are anchored within its national identity and determine (at least 
partially) the appropriate behaviour. Within the context of internationality, this behaviour is 
translated into foreign policy. State identity politics is the process where political actors use 
their own identity and therefore their own representations to influence state behaviour in 
order to alter the country’s foreign policy agenda89. Through this process is the political 
actor gaining support, or acquiring opposition, for a particular policy that deals with the 
relation to other states. These policies are, in turn, viewed as state representations. The 
consequences of these policies could reinforce or weaken accepted beliefs about state 
portrayal. State identity politics refers to the process where individuals are attempting to 
influence state identity90. State identity politics can manifests itself in decisions regarding 
spending capital in developing nations or whether or not to use military force. Climate 
change, technological advancements and privacy are some more examples that fit within 
state identity politics. 
State identity politics is used to strategically alter foreign policy orientations. Political actors 
compete with other political actors who are their domestic or their international rivals for a 
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particular understanding of an identity of a social group91. Foreign policy is here the 
framework to move beyond domestic contestation about identity politics. It serves as a way 
to persuade other (political) actors to accept their specific identity proposal. Groups, in the 
form of political parties, compete domestically and internationally and are trying to 
establish a standard of what the appropriate national identity is. Foreign policy adds a layer 
of legitimacy, support and esteem92. Identity politics becomes externalized and can serve as 
a successful strategy for domestic fights.  
 
Part 2 – Practical examples of identity politics 
So far, the theoretical foundation has been laid down and identity politics has been 
theoretically studied from its positive and its negative aspects. To make the topic more 
tangible, there will be practical examples presented. The two case studies will be India and 
the United States. The former is an interesting example of identity politics because India’s 
approach towards identity politics slightly differs from what has been discussed so far. 
Which fits perfectly in the intended objective; which is to examine every aspect of identity 
politics. Identity politics is being deployed by government officials, with Narendra Modi as 
the most noteworthy. Identity politics is in India not invoked because of past grievances, but 
on what Modi’s government perceives as current grievances – but grounded in past 
experiences. This makes India an interesting case study. The United States is chosen as a 
more obvious example, because identity politics is emerged there. Lastly, due to absolute 
importance and relevancy is Black Lives Matter examined. 
 
The case of India 
India gained independence in 1947 and the country has had to deal with four specific 
identity based groups ever since: religion, language, caste and tribe93. The most spoken 
language is Hindi, but there are over fifteen other languages that are spoken by at least ten 
million Indians each. To be more precise: Hindi is the most spoken and prominent language, 
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but the majority of India’s population speaks another language. India’s main religion is 
Hindu, but there are several other religious systems; there are three caste categories and 
eight percent of the population, which are approximately 110 million Indians, are classified 
as belonging to a tribe94. This diversity became an important point of recognition and 
acceptance and speaks to the core of India as a nation – at least, that is what Mahatma 
Gandhi preached95. The idea was that the many contestations over identity had to be 
transcended in order to get the ‘unity-in-diversity’ approach to succeed96. Unfortunately, 
this policy had been weakly institutionalized and contention over identity differences paved 
way to a myriad of subnational identities97. India’s political system lives within the liberal 
democratic framework and India hosts the world’s largest-scaled democratic election. This 
democratic reality enables the articulation of political demands that are grounded in 
identity-based grievances. The tensions and conflicts between the different groups and 
communities remain troublesome. India did implement some institutional arrangements to 
alleviate some of these tensions. Unfortunately, these attempts remain unsuccessful98. This 
is mainly due to the failure of the institutional system and India’s government to recognize 
the smaller and marginalized groups99.  
 
Identity politics based on religion 
India integrated in the global economic order in the 1990s by embarking on market-oriented 
reforms100. In the same period, a specific type of identity politics emerged; one that was 
solely focused on religion. Key to this emergence was the national broadcasting of religious-
mythological epics, like Ramayana, which was an example of an attempt by the government 
to adapt to the market-oriented changes101. Ramayana links economic reforms to 
liberalization.  It tells the story of the lost Utopia, an idea that was summoned by the Hindu 
nationalists, and the brave new world; a contemporary reality that was promised by the 
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same Hindu nationalists. This was applauded by the market enthusiasts102. What specific 
dynamics account for the rise of this majoritarian identity politics remains open for debate, 
but the 1990s are nevertheless known for the fundamental redefinition of India’s identity in 
the context of Hinduism.  
The political wing of Hindu nationalism is the Bharatiya Janata Party, the BJP. Led by 
Narendra Modi, the party has won a parliamentary majority in the 2014 and 2019 elections. 
The BJP thrives on an anti-Muslim and pro-business agenda, making the BJP an active fighter 
for symbolic identity103. The strong emphasis on the Hindu identity is downplaying identity 
politics that is employed by marginalized groups, while simultaneously using their own 
identity politics to further the BJP cause. Vandita Mishra, a National Opinion Editor for the 
Indian Express104, wrote extensively about the political vision of the BJP. She points out that 
BJP deploys an ideological narrative called Hindutva, a Hindu nationalist philosophy 
formulated by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, an Indian independence activist105. As a 
consequence, the BJP engages in persistent ‘Othering’. The non-Hindus, particularly the 
Muslims, wear the proverbial hat of ‘the Other’. The political objective of Hindutva is to 
establish a Hindu state and securing the collective rights of the Hindu community106. The 
particular focus on the Hindu community comes at the cost of other (religious) communities 
and their rights. By first attracting the popular support of the Hindu majority, BJP tries to 
‘mould’ domestic opinion for their support of a Hindu reformation107. Modi and his party 
the BJP aim for regime stability by using the rhetoric and symbols of identity politics. The 
slogan “achhe din aane waale hain”, which translates to “good days are coming”, was Modi 
his main rhetorical tool during the 2014 general election108. In 2019, this was “nara”, which 
stands for “national ambition and regional aspiration”109. Both highlight the clear vision 
Modi has for an economic rising and shining India, preferably devoid of regional differences. 
The latter is an odd aspiration due to the many entrenched differences within the country. 
Any economic hardship, like a possible economic decline, does not correspond with the 
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political narrative with its specific pro-business focus. To bypass this and to control the 
entire national conversation, the BJP has shifted the discourse from discussions about socio-
economic development to issues that centre identity politics110. The discourse is changed to 
the “identity politics of Hindu renaissance and revivalism”111. The declining economy 
becomes a secondary topic within this strategy. 
Hindu nationalists believe that Christians and Muslims form a threat to the national identity 
and to India in its entirety112. The perception of particularly the Muslim citizens as ‘the 
Other’ has caused Modi to demand government action in the form of legislative measures. 
In 2019, three anti-Muslim laws were passed by parliament – with the most controversial 
being the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). The CAA was initially publicized as that it 
would both reclaim the constitutional values and the ‘idea for India’. Also, the CAA is said to 
preserve the secular ethos113. This last reason has been received with ridicule by the global 
media; who are saying that India’s secular image, even though this notion is present in its 
constitution, is significantly dented because of this act114. The CAA offers amnesty and 
citizenship to non-Muslim illegal immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. It 
amends the previous citizenship law, which prohibited any illegal migrants to become Indian 
citizens. In addition, the CAA expedites the route to become an Indian citizen for six 
religious minority groups – as long as they can prove they are from the aforementioned 
three Muslim-majority countries. When the CAA was passed into law it sparked widespread 
controversy and demonstrations. It is said to marginalize India’s Muslim community because 
it grants amnesty on the basis of religion. Opponents question its constitutional validity and 
it sparked massive protests across the country. The CAA is a legislation rooted in the 
characteristics of identity politics; where a specific religious identity is advanced and the 
Muslim identity is disregarded.  
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The role of the Supreme Court 
Interestingly: on January 2, 2017, the Indian Supreme Court banned any appeal made to 
identity in electoral politics in the Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen case115. The Supreme 
Court provided a new judgement on the interpretation of the 1951 Representation of the 
People Act. This law governs the way elections are conducted. Section 123 (3) maintained 
that attempting to gain votes on the basis of religion, caste or community is ‘corrupt’116. The 
consequence would be disqualification of the electoral process. Due to interpretation 
difficulties the judges of the Supreme Court stepped in. The Court ruled that India is a 
secular country and that invoking caste, religion, community or language is not relevant for 
the political process. Abrihim Singh v. C.D. Commachen ruled that as electoral 
malpractice117. Any political actor that participates in electoral politics and invokes any of 
these four categories is officially in violation of the law. It is clear that the Supreme Court is 
working to establish the right conditions for a balanced political system; one that provides 
equal opportunities for all. Regardless of this intention, the practicality in a country where 
religion and community serve as the main political tool is questionable. Especially 
considering that identity politics is still a relevant tool employed by political actors. 
However, in essence, Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen bans the use of identity politics. 
The discrepancy between this legislation and the political reality can be traced back to the 
1995 Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte case. R. Y. Prabhoo was the 
mayor of Mumbai in 1987 and 1988 and was in 1987 elected as an independent candidate 
into the legislative assembly. Allegations were made against Prabhoo for corrupt practices – 
based on the 1951 Representation of the People Act. What makes this case an important 
case in identity politics research is that it lays down the difference between Hindutva and 
Hinduism. The Supreme Court ruled that Hindutva is “a way of life, or a state of mind of the 
people of India, and should not be equated with Hindu fundamentalism”118. Based on this 
ruling, when Hindutva is used in the electoral process an appeal can be made to the ethos of 
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Indian society and culture. An appeal on religious grounds, as is forbidden based on the law, 
can be circumvented. 
This ruling still stands, regardless of the 2017 Supreme Court ban on identity politics. The 
Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen case ruling did not interpret, clarify or overrule the 
court’s decision on Hindutva. As long as Hindutva is understood and applied as ‘a way of 
life’, than the Supreme Court ruling and any legal violations can be circumvented. Hindutva 
is in that case interpreted differently than a religious appeal. This explains why Modi and the 
BJP can still invoke identity politics. 
 
Identity politics in India’s foreign policy 
The Hindutva ideology also has its footing in India’s foreign policy. Modi and party members 
of the BJP believe that Hindutva provides the means to build a tough and strong India119. 
This must provide the basis for a strong national security as well as anchor India’s place on 
the international stage. That said, the broad trajectory of Modi’s foreign policy has seen few 
changes since he is in office. Ian Hall wrote “Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign 
Policy” and Rajesh Basrur wrote “Modi’s Foreign Policy Fundamentals – A Trajectory 
Unchanged”, where both analysed Modi’s foreign policy discourse and concluded that there 
are few shifts in its trajectory – despite what the title of the former suggests. However, ever 
since his second electoral win, Modi is taking more Hindutva-based decisions120. Whether or 
not this also means that Modi is taking a more firm stance in his foreign policy discourse 
remains to be seen. This is also dependent on the domestic context – which is now 
characterized by a struggling economy, that is simultaneously being overshadowed by 
divisive nationalism.  
 
When it comes to identity politics, India is a peculiar and clear example. They use identity 
politics without absolute hindrance from the courts. India demonstrates that identity 
politics can be translated in a piece of legislation and that this can have far reaching 
consequences. Its also not grounded on past grievances, but more on current ‘grievances’. It 
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remains to be seen how far Modi can go, even though he is democratically chosen. India is 
an example of the negativity that identity politics can produce.  
 
The case of the United States  
 
The election of Trump and the role of Obama 
The reason why Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election is often attributed to one 
major theme: identity politics121. Sides, Tesler & Vavreck, all political scientists, have 
analysed the 2016 election campaign and covered it in the book ‘Identity Crisis’. The authors 
conclude that identity politics is defining and changing contemporary American politics122. 
They contribute the election of Donald Trump to identity politics, but also argue that the 
presidency of Barack Obama is an inevitable contributor to it123. Reasoning begins with the 
basic idea that identities matter in election times. Identity determine one’s political 
affiliations and who they want as political representatives. In the case of the United States, 
being a Democrat or a Republican was arguably the most salient identity of an individual. 
Before 2008, when the largest part of the power structure was occupied by white 
individuals, whiteness as an identity attribute might not have been on the minds of most 
white Americans124. This changed when Barack Obama was inaugurated as the first black 
president125. Ezra Klein wrote an article for Vox.com where he reasoned that Barack Obama 
surpassed the idea of only being identified as a Democrat126. Instead, the main 
characterization was his racial background. This became the biggest topic of conversation 
and as soon as he got elected, racial attitudes and racial identities became potent political 
forces127. This lead to a widening gap between the political opinions of blacks and whites. 
Even though some hoped that Obama’s presidency would invoke a post-racial period, the 
reality demonstrates an opposite effect. The political beliefs, when based on racial 
 
121 Sides et al. (2017), 2. 
122 Conclusion drawn from Klein (2018) 
123 Sides, Tesler & Vavreck (2019), 13. 
124 Klein (2018) 
125 Ibid. 
126 https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/5/18052390/trump-2018-2016-identity-politics-
democrats-immigration-race 
127 Sides, Tesler & Vayreck (2019), 13. 
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considerations, have become even more polarized128. Race has become a massive political 
influence and racial considerations increasingly influence political decision-making129. 
Barack Obama changed the political identity in the United States and this contributed to the 
election of Donald Trump. Trump appeals to a form of white nationalist fear that views the 
increase of non-white Americans as a threat130. He created a narrative in which the white 
men, as well as the evangelical Christians, were presented as a minority group that is being 
oppressed by the oppressive coalition131. Trump has been tapping into what is often 
described as white identity politics, thereby often deploying racial and racist language. The 
2016 American National Election Study has conducted research on the role of white identity 
politics and how this predicts support for Trump132. Their data suggests that a white racial 
identity and the belief in the unfair treatment of whites serve as predictors for the support 
of Trump: see figure 2 below. The idea that identity politics played an important role in the 
general election is not a new one, but it is important to note that there are more variables 
that contribute to the election of Trump. Issues like educational background, overall stance 
on immigration or a particular dislike to Hilary Clinton all serve as explanatory variables.  
 
128 This is the main thesis of Tesler (2016) 
129 Ibid. 
130 Tesler & Sides (2016) 
131 Ibid. 
132 This is data from the Republican Primaries and not from the general election. However, its conclusion does 
provide relevant information on the political climate 
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Figure 2: The correlation between Trump support and white identity politics. Source: 2016 
ANES Pilot Study133 
 
 
 
 
 
133 Graph from Tesler, Sides & Vavreck (2019), 91. 
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Black Lives Matter 
Identity politics has been defined at the beginning of this thesis. With the help of a few set 
characteristics, identity politics is defined as a form of political activism. People form 
alliances based on a specific identity trait, like religion, race, ethnicity or gender and these 
alliances become politically organized. The goal is to demand the rights that have been 
denied to these groups because of that particular identity trait. Past grievances often shape 
its specific narrative. Black Lives Matter is a movement that fits perfectly inside the identity 
politics box.  
George Floyd, a black 46-year old man, has been killed in Minnesota by a white police 
officer on May 25 2020. Derek Chauvin, the police officer, had pressed his knee on the neck 
of Floyd for almost eight minutes; thereby directly causing the death of Floyd. This 
institutional murder as a consequence of systemic racism sparked massive protests in the 
United States and all over the world. Under the banner of Black Lives Matter, these protests 
campaign against racism. The movement is based on the injustices and inequality 
experienced by Black people134. These are found in the historical power struggles and the 
reality of a colonial past. It was as if the murder, which happened for the umpteenth time, 
created a metaphorical mirror in which the whole word was able to see their own national 
history and reflect on the extent of its racial injustice. The mirror portrayed different images 
and realities for different countries, but were all anchored within the Black Lives Matter 
narrative. In Australia, the hashtag #aboriginallivesmatter became trending and in Poland 
the use of the word Murzyn became topic of conversation; which is a term for black 
individuals and is regarded as offensive135. In England, the statue of Edward Colston, a slave 
trader, was toppled and tossed in a Bristol river. Sudan, Indonesia and Brazil experienced 
similar events. Just like the #MeToo movement, Black Lives Matter sparked global clamour 
where equal rights are demanded based on a particular identity trait. It shifted public 
consciousness and has already enforced changes – so has the Minneapolis City Council 
issued a resolution that disbands their police department fully136.  
 
 
134 Nayak (2020) 
135 Pilling (2020) 
136 Wills (2020) 
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BLM was a response to the 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman, a white police officer who 
shot and killed Trayvon Martin, an unarmed 17-year old African American137. BLM began as 
#BlackLivesMatter on social media and gained national traction after the 2014 street 
demonstrations as a response to the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner. Two years 
later, in 2016, BLM became topical during the presidential election. The movement has 
received its share of criticism as well, especially regarding its slogan “Black Lives Matter”. 
Critics assert that adopting a more universal approach instead of emphasizing the particular 
is a necessary condition for recognizing our shared common humanity138. Rand Paul, who 
was a presidential candidate for the Republicans in 2015, believed that the slogan should be 
changed to “All Lives Matter”. He asserted that the focus on one racial identity equals the 
bullying of other groups139. Donald Trump echoed the slogan All Lives Matter as an 
alternative to “the racialised BLM movement”140. 
 
Anti-identity identity politics 
The basic assumption behind identity politics is that political activism based on identity is 
valid. The belief that identity in itself can form the fundamental focus of political action is 
the essential driver of every argument made within identity politics. When Black Lives 
Matter is changed to “All Lives Matter”, there is a particular rejection of identity politics. 
Supporters of All Lives Matter reject the belief that identity can be the main category for 
exercising politics. Joshua Paul names this phenomenon ‘anti-identity identity politics’; 
where All Lives Matter serves as a case study of anti-identity identity politics141. The ‘anti-
identity’ refers to the rejection of the identity category as a legitimate source of political 
action142. It is presumed that identity should not have a place in politics; it has to be 
decoupled from the political, economic and social realm. When, in the case of BLM, there is 
oppression or brutality towards them, this is not attributed to institutional structures. 
Instead, it is believed that this problem is attributed to culture143. That inherently means 
 
137 Paul (2018), 3. 
138 Said by Maguire (2016) 
139 Paul (2018), 4. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Paul (2019), 3. 
142 Ibid, 9. 
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that there is also only one way to solve this problem; and that is through culture. These 
culturalist diverge the focus of BLM away from state violence to individual ‘Black-on-Black 
crime’. This view is exemplified by Peggy Hubbard, a resident from Ferguson, who went viral 
with her rant on the BLM movement144. Hubbard focused not on policy brutality but instead 
on black brutality; claiming that the blacks are the most violent people she has ever seen 
and she consequently pleads for personal responsibility. Hubbard rejects the idea that 
racism holds any significance and rather opts for the individual responsibility and a closer 
look to the harsh reality of black culture.  
All Lives Matter is grounded in ‘anti-identity identity politics’. This preaches a universal 
identity, thereby rejecting any recognition of the particular145. The idea behind anti-identity 
identity politics is that the truth lies in sameness and every law, every piece of legislation, is 
blind to differences. Private interests and group affiliations are therefore surpassed. Identity 
politics is seen as mere defensiveness and unproductive for any political participation146. All 
Lives Matter operates on the belief that the state is ethnically neutral. Identarian claims are 
grounded in collective universality. This is the same dynamic present within ‘anti-identity 
identity politics’. It is a type of identity politics but then without separate and specific group 
claims. Whilst they reject identity politics and its specific focus on identity traits, there is an 
inherent contradiction in All Lives Matter and ‘anti-identity identity politics’. The 
contradiction is that All Lives Matter does deploy identity; namely by adopting a post-racial 
approach that deploys a neoliberal identity as its foundational focus147. The collective 
identity is built upon the idea of the post-racial neoliberal citizen. It is a new type of identity 
politics that goes beyond race and opts for personal responsibility. Identity is thus deployed 
strategically while they call for collective action. Demands are either to reinforce or to 
weaken existing institutions in order to preserve the neoliberal culture; including the values, 
structures and policies148. The focus remains on the individual, but together they must 
realize collective action. As with neoliberalism, acts of racism and racism in its entirety are 
perceived as matters of individual calculation. A characteristic of identity politics is that its 
proponents demand recognition for their particular identity. Within All Lives Matter, the 
 
144 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0ueaM7rMOU for a summary and a redirection  
145 Paul (2019), 10. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Paul (2019), 5. 
148 Paul (2019), 13. 
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issue of race is specifically asked to not be recognised. This way, race becomes ‘non-
recognized’. However, and to quote David Theo Goldberg, this is “racism without race, 
racism gone private, racism without the categories to name it as such”149. 
 
The phenomenon of ‘anti-identity identity politics’ is an interesting counter movement to 
identity politics. All Lives Matter served here as a practical counter example to the identity 
politics’ Black Lives Matters. The examination of ALM revealed a paradoxical reality – where 
its rejection of an identity is being replaced with a search for another specific identity (the 
post-racial neoliberalist). Without making any ungrounded inferences about the entire anti-
identity identity politics; this does indicates that even the denial of one identity trait can be 
translated into the desire for another one. Even when the intention is the opposite, it does 
indicate the importance that identity plays in contemporary politics. Political participation 
becomes less focused on ideology or economically driven motivations. Furthermore, when 
BLM is changed to ALM, the rhetorical power of Black Lives Matter is diminshed. You turn a 
blind eye to lived experiences of class-society and simultaenously add a part of society in its 
wider narrative while this place has always been denied. The BLM is a practicle example of 
how identity politics can be used for its theoretically based objectives. 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has aimed to answer the following research question: “To what extent does 
identity politics domestically and internationally influence politics, democracies and foreign 
policy?” 
The research question was broad; this was intended since it was aimed to explore the full 
story of identity politics. The whole endeavour started with an analyses of a book written by 
Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama pessimistically concluded that identity politics is undermining 
and even endangering the workings of a liberal democracy. Identity politics as a term 
increasingly popped up within popular media articles and, here too, was often described as 
harmful, adverse and even dangerous. Frustratingly, the term was hardly academically 
 
149 Goldberg (2009), 23. 
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defined. Aside from some loose definitions, identity politics seem to merely signify 
“something not desirable”. 
With that narrative in mind, this thesis has ended up to provide a more nuanced image. It 
started with reviewing the existing academic literature, which provided the initial tools to 
define identity politics. Building on these findings, this thesis systematically explored the 
definition of the term starting with ‘identity’ as a concept, then moving to ‘groupness’ 
before arriving at the term itself. Aside from the definition, it is established that identity 
politics is politically relevant, influential and controversial. Identity politics firstly relies on 
the mutual identification of an identity trait. When this trait become politicized and policy 
changes are demanded, identity groups enter a form of political activism. This gives rise to 
identity politics.  
The thesis continued to provide both arguments in favour and against the use of identity 
politics, thereby highlighting the issues over-determination, polarization, the questioning of 
conventional norms and social progress. After that, its relationship with democracies was 
explored.  
Identity politics thrive in democratic systems. The liberties that accompany this political 
system enable the formation of identity groups. The right to assemble, the right to protest 
and have your voice heard are among the necessary conditions for identity politics to 
flourish. The relationship with democratic politics and group identity is a complex one, but 
when the fight is for the institutionalization of equal treatment than identity politics aid in 
the pursuit of democracies’ good. That said, democracies are based on civic equality and on 
equal regard for individuals; this means that identity groups come in secondary and they do 
not constitute democracies’ ultimate source of value.  
This view is more nuanced than the narrative that Fukuyama presented. Identity politics 
need democracies, and democracies need identity politics. There are concerning aspects, 
especially when identity groups occupy the moral high ground and demand that their 
political agenda surpasses that of the wider society. When identity hegemony is the goal, 
than the freedoms of the individual are impeded –  where this freedom remains the 
ultimate source of value in a democracy. 
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Identity politics moves internationally when political actors use their identity and their 
identity politics to influence foreign policy and therefore state behaviour. This constructivist 
narrative clashes with the widely acted realist paradigm. That said, this thesis demonstrated 
that the use of identity should rightfully receive attention and that identity politics can act 
as a determinant factor within state behaviour. The most general message when identity 
politics is moving internationally is that scholars have to accept that socio-cultural factors 
have the possibility to temper state interests. 
The practical examples from India and the United States demonstrate how identity politics 
can be used for bad and for good. Modi’s political agenda is rooted in identity politics and 
the way he is using this form of political activism is by oppressing the already marginalized 
Muslim minority. Modi’s desire for identity hegemony endangers the pluralistic nature of 
India’s democratic society and this perfectly illustrates how identity politics can have far-
reaching negative results.  
The case of Black Lives Matter served as its positive counterpart. BLM illustrates how 
identity politics can be used for social progress and for the demand to shift the balance of 
power. It strives for the political change for groups whose identity is historically oppressed 
and marginalized. It is a necessary tool for political activism and the values embedded within 
a liberal democracy enables this demand for action. When critics frame BLM’s identity 
politics in a derogatory way and assert that the slogan must be changed to “All Lives 
Matter”, they must be cautious that this will change the entire narrative. What effectively 
happens is that all mentions of race will be erased. The initial discourse on police brutality 
and structural forms of racism and violence will then be altered into a two-dimensional 
conversation; one where race either matters, or not at all. The seriousness of the 
movement, and the amount of oppression that the blacks have had to endure in the past, 
makes the specific mention of race a necessary condition. If not, the aim for equality might 
be undermined by not acknowledging the inequalities. 
 
This thesis tried to be as nuanced as possible by providing arguments from both sides to 
determine whether identity politics must be seen as a friend or a foe. The last message of 
this thesis must be that identity politics is widely misunderstood. Yes, it can be a valuable 
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tool for political movements and for overall civic engagement. And yes, it can also be used 
for immoral reasons. However, it would be unrealistic to demand from individuals that they 
divorce their past experiences, bad or otherwise, from their political participation. Plus, 
identity politics did not cause the prevalence off all the different identities and their 
accompanying hardships. Identity politics is merely exposing those differences.  With this in 
mind and as to answer to Fukuyama: it can be wondered whether it is that bad to base 
electoral decisions on one’s identity, instead of on ideology. 
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